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This study examines the impact of EMU on consumption smoothing by proceeding differ-
ently than usual. Rather than base conclusions about the impact of EMU on consumption smooth-
ing on its impact on the level or growth rate of consumption, we rely instead on EMU’s impact on 
the volatility of consumption. The volatility is a more direct measure of consumption smoothing. 
The conclusions about consumption smoothing based on the usual inferences, we shall argue, may 
not hold. By centering on volatility of consumption (as Huizenga and Zhu (2004) largely do before 
us), we also allow more sources of influence of EMU to come into view. As a result of this change 
in methodology, we are able to show that EMU led to consumption smoothing in our study peri-
od, ending in 2006, but did so strictly through a different avenue of influence than the typical one. 
The effect comes, we claim, through the promotion of the tradability of goods, capital in particu-
lar: specifically, the encouragement of price competition, contestable home markets, ability to bor-
row and buy insurance at home, and the harmonization of regulations. It does not come through 
higher cross-country holdings of property claims or the typical focus in related analyses of the is-
sue.  
According to the usual approach, stemming from Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) 
(hereafter ASY), the impact of any capital market development on consumption smoothing de-
pends on the development’s impact on the response of a country’s relative consumption to a 
movement in its relative output, where relative consumption is the ratio of the country’s consump-
tion per head to the consumption per head in a relevant set of other countries, possibly the rest of 
the world, and relative output is defined correspondingly. A tendency of the capital market devel-
opment to smooth consumption should mean a tendency to weaken or break the tie of home con-
sumption to home output. The underlying logic is that so far as a country shares risks with others 
in a group, its consumption relative to the rest in the group should be independent of its output 
performance in relation to the rest. In other words, asymmetric output shocks within the group 
should affect consumption among all the members evenly without particular repercussions on rela-
tive consumption between them. In their original contribution, which has proved extremely influ-
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ential and fertile, ASY admitted three channels of influence on relative consumption: cross-country 
property claims, borrowing/lending and upper-level government transfers. But recent applications 
of the approach center on the channel of cross-country property holdings alone. See, as examples, 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2004), Sørensen et al (2007), Artis and Hoffmann (2007, 2008), Corcoran 
(2008), and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2009) (hereafter KPT)).1 
However, this approach is open to the same sort of doubt that Rodrik (1998) raised in re-
gard to trade openness: namely, that while the relevant risk sharing may mean more insurance in 
some respects, it may also mean more risk exposure in other respects. The aggregate change in 
risk bearing is uncertain and whether consumption smoothing should rise or fall is uncertain too.  
To elaborate, consider a relevant rise in cross-country holdings of property claims. This is 
not just any rise whatever but one that contributes to dissociating movements in relative gross 
national income from movements in relative gross domestic products (as, for example, a rise in 
foreign borrowing to finance home output would not do). The relevant sort of rise in cross-
country holdings means heavier reliance on foreign economic activity for income. Clearly the 
change implies more protection of home income and home consumption from domestic output 
shocks, as the approach says. However, by the same token, the change also subjects home proper-
ty owners to new shocks from abroad, geographically where depending on the particular pattern 
of foreign investment (which varies by country, as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), hereafter LMF, 
emphasize).  This is the fundamental source of doubt. The relevance of this consideration in our 
sample period of 1980-2006 and in studying EMU should be fairly obvious. As it happens, a wave 
of trade and financial liberalization took place during this period starting in the mid- and late eight-
ies that was followed by a surge of gross foreign investment in the nineties (see LMF (2008) and 
KPT (2009)). The ensuing surge of investment could well have been meant to take advantage of 
new profit opportunities and to protect against new competitive threats. Risk diversification might 
                                                        
1 In a closely related approach, inspired by Backus et al. (1992, 1995) and Baxter (1995), the question is more 
simply to what extent EMU has divorced bilateral correlations in consumption from bilateral correlations in output. 
For an application, see Imbs (2004a), p. 23 and Table C2 (in sections that disappeared in the published version). 
See also Imbs (2004b). Obstfeld (1994) suggests a different but closely related and equally simple approach. 
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not even have been a primary objective. Suppose then that it is true, just as Sørensen et al (2007) 
and KPT (2009) would indicate, that the new capital market engagements in the nineties and since 
contributed to a divorce of idiosyncratic movements in home consumption from idiosyncratic 
movement in home income in the OECD or industrial countries or both. Nonetheless, might not 
consumers in the relevant countries still have become more vulnerable now to risk from output 
shocks in the aggregate? Therefore might not home consumption be less smooth not more so? 
Evidently, these same questions apply to EMU separately, apart from deregulation, since this par-
ticular form of capital market development itself opened up new profit opportunities and new 
competitive threats as well as more scope for insurance.  
As another reason for studying consumption volatility directly, the increase in gross foreign 
investments in 1980-2006 could have modified the dynamics of price and wealth movements, par-
ticularly in view of some of the financial innovations like securitization and special purpose vehi-
cles, and thereby could have modified the responses of consumption to all shocks, not only asym-
metric supply ones. Furthermore, EMU could have contributed to all these developments (com-
pare Lane (2001)). 
For these reasons, we shall study the impact of EMU on consumption volatility directly.2 A 
further ground for doing so is that the change in approach allows more sources of influence to 
come into view. Accordingly, we shall admit two more channels of influence of EMU on con-
sumption volatility.  The first one regards tradability. EMU could affect the line between tradable 
and non-tradable goods and affect consumption smoothing in that manner. It could do so by in-
                                                        
2 It should be noted also that traditional research on business cycles, with no particular focus on risk sharing, uni-
formly yields ambiguous results about the impact of international capital market integration via gross foreign in-
vestment on the volatility of output, and whenever this is a separate subject, on the volatility of consumption too; 
and these ambiguous results hold in the relevant period as well as earlier ones and for the same advanced countries 
that Sørensen et al (2007) and KPT (2009) treat. See Razin and Rose (1994), Sutherland (1996), Easterly et al 
(2000), Buch (2002) and Buch et al (2005), Evans and Hnatkovska (2007), Tharavanij (2007), and Kose, Prasad, 
Rogoff and Wei (2009). Further and quite significantly, when Sørensen and Yosha depart from their usual ap-
proach in joint work with Kalemli-Ozcan and compare the symmetry of shocks to incomes (GNPs) with those to 
output (GDPs) in the EU, they find significantly higher asymmetry of GNPs than GDPs in the group (Kalemli-
Ozcan et al (2004)). As they recognize, this fits badly with the hypothesis that EU members get insurance against 
output shocks from the international diversification of their property claims and their response on this point (high 
volatility of financial returns) fits entirely with our argument. 
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creasing price competition, the contestability of home markets and the harmonization of regula-
tions. Studies by Baele et al (2004) and Jappelli and Pagano 2008) point in this direction. Quite 
specifically, capital market integration in the EU could have made it easier to borrow and obtain 
insurance based on wealth consisting of domestic real estate, housing and plant and future labor 
income and could have made it easier to switch between lenders and insurers. These changes then 
might have increased the ability of EU households to smooth consumption apart from any diversi-
fication of property claims.3  
In addition, EMU could also affect consumption smoothing through its effect on openness 
to trade. In his renowned contribution on this subject, Rose (2000) concentrated on the effect of 
currency union on bilateral trade between union members. But there might be a corresponding 
multilateral effect on trade or openness. Indeed, following Rose, experiments with the impact of 
currency union on trade with third-countries generally show a positive effect of currency union on 
outsiders too (see, for example, Micco et al. (2003) as well as Rose (2000), table 5c), which 
would then imply greater trade openness in general. In principle, the implications for consumption 
smoothing could go either way. The rise in openness might mean more insulation from output 
shocks at home and thereby more consumption smoothing. Yet it might also mean more vulnera-
bility to foreign shocks and thereby less consumption smoothing. Rodrik (1998) famously empha-
sized the vulnerability to foreign shocks. In conformity, Karras and Song (1996) report a positive 
effect of openness on output volatility. KPT (2003) obtain this result for consumption volatility as 
well (compare Moser et al (2004) and Lane (2006b)).  
Accordingly, we shall allow three separate avenues of influence of EMU on consumption 
volatility to enter the analysis. The first will be an indirect effect coming through an impact on 
cross-property claims. This first avenue will encompass the usual channel of influence in the ASY 
literature but it will be broader since it will not be confined to consequences of asymmetric output 
supply shocks. The second avenue of influence will be a direct effect of EMU on consumption 
smoothing through goods and capital market integration which is independent of cross-property 
                                                        
3 We are highly indebted to a conversation with Oren Sussman for this line of thought. 
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claims. Since we control for the volatility of relative prices, we will interpret this direct influence 
as coming from a change in the tradability of goods in general and capital in particular. Thirdly, we 
will allow an indirect effect via trade openness. Throughout we shall also admit the possibility that 
EU membership rather than EMU is the factor at work.  
We find that EMU contributed to capital market integration in Europe, just as others re-
port using a variety of criteria and study methods (see Rajan and Zingales (2003), Baele et al. 
(2004), Lane (2006a), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), Jappelli and Pagano (2008), De Santis and 
Gérard (2009), Coeurdacier and Martin (2009) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010). However, as al-
ready indicated, so far as this increase in capital market integration takes the form of more cross-
country property claims, no smoothing of consumption results, or at least no smoothing did so in 
the study period, and this is true regardless of the decomposition of the rise in cross-country 
claims between loans, equities and FDI, or between assets and liabilities. Thus, there is no evi-
dence of consumption smoothing through the usual channel in the ASY-literature. Instead, the 
consumption smoothing happens through our second channel. EMU reduces consumption volatili-
ty by about .2 of one percent through this next channel. This last smoothing effect is also robust. It 
also follows in the presence of influences of relative prices.  In addition, even though the effect 
depends partly on EU membership, EMU clearly adds to it. The effect of EMU on consumption 
smoothing through our third and last channel or trade openness is secondary. EMU increases trade 
openness, though it does so strictly by promoting cross-country property claims rather than direct-
ly touching trade (compare Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007)). However, if anything, there is less 
consumption smoothing as a result, since openness increases consumption volatility. This last ad-
verse cross-effect, though, is too small to matter in an overall assessment.   
There is one major associated departure from the literature. We define currency union dif-
ferently. In the usual definition, a currency union is a binary variable that is either 0 or 1. However, 
this definition is problematic in analyzing multilateral behavior, since no country shares the same 
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currency with all of its trade partners. Thus, in order to study the effect of EMU on risk sharing 
based on the usual measure (using the ASY approach), Demyanyk et al (2008) limit themselves to 
a sample consisting of EMU members only and base their inferences about EMU either on the 
level or the trend in the members’ behavior before and since membership. They also compare 
members’ behavior with that of the larger EU membership.  However, any welfare inferences 
about EMU based essentially on changes in the relationships within the membership or within the 
larger membership of the EU cannot be decisive, as the authors largely recognize, since the EMU 
itself may have increased the symmetry of shocks affecting the members (through common mone-
tary policy if nothing else), and in this manner the system might call on the members to engage in 
disproportionate investment outside the group and outside the EU in order to stabilize their in-
comes. More generally, the welfare issue cannot be whether EMU smoothes consumption within 
the membership since this could be entirely at the expense of smoothing of asymmetric shocks 
with outsiders. It must be whether EMU smoothes consumption for the members on the whole or 
in relation to everyone. 
As a result, we propose a multilateral measure of currency union as the percentage of total 
trade a country does with others sharing the same currency relative to its total foreign trade. This 
measure fits nicely with the theory of optimal currency areas, according to which the benefits of 
currency union for a country vary positively with its trade with the union membership relative to 
its total trade. A higher ratio of trade with other members of a currency union means that a coun-
try captures a higher share of the possible economies in transaction costs that are obtainable from 
a single currency. In addition, it may also mean that the country loses less from the abandon of 
independent monetary policy. Frankel and Rose (1998) have shown that greater trade between 
countries increases the symmetry of business cycles between them. Further, the measure yields no 
confusion with openness. In our sample, the correlation between the proposed measure and open-
ness is around .05 for the world as a whole and .18 within the EMU. There is therefore no difficul-
ty combining the measure with using openness as a separate variable in the analysis.  
One might object to our measure, nonetheless, on grounds that it concerns breadth or ex-
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tensiveness rather than mere presence or absence of currency union. But is this necessarily a draw-
back, especially in analyzing consumption smoothing? Suppose that EMU increases consumption 
smoothing. Why should the improvement per person be the same in all member countries regard-
less how much trade they do with one another, as the binary measure would suppose? Why should 
the improvement not be larger in a country that does an unusually large amount of trade with un-
ion members, therefore for Belgium than for Ireland in EMU for example, as our measure propos-
es instead?  
As a final consideration, the proposed measure yields results that correspond closely with 
earlier ones for the effect of EMU on cross-holdings of foreign property claims and trade. To all 
appearance, therefore, the measure deals with the same phenomenon that others treat with a binary 
measure (and which we would continue to treat this way in a bilateral context). 
The next section, II, sets forth our basic econometric model. The following section, III, 
discusses the econometric method. The one after, IV, explains our data sources. The succeeding 
one, V, presents our test results. Section VI offers some closing discussion. 
II. The econometric model 
 
a. General aspects 
In order to provide some general intuition for our econometric model, we start from the 
principle that consumers in each country maximize an intertemporal utility function with diminish-
ing marginal utility in consumption; namely: 
)u(CβU s
Tt
ts
ts
t ∑
+
=
−=        0)(Cu0)(Cu ss <′′>′   (1) 
where β is the personal discount rate of the future, u(Cs) is the utility of consumption in period s, 
and t+T is the relevant time horizon starting from period t. Based on diminishing marginal utility, 
there is risk aversion: low volatility of consumption raises welfare. Suppose next that capital mar-
kets are imperfect.  Information and contracting are costly; the enforcement of contracts is too; 
there are numerous interest rates at all maturities and there is credit rationing. Therefore, period-
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consumption depends on current cash flows as well as wealth and the annuity value of wealth. In 
this context, assume a variety of shocks: shocks to output, tastes, and relative prices. How much 
destabilization of consumption results and thus how much utility loss follows will depend on inter-
national capital market integration, the level of trade, the sophistication of domestic finance and as 
we shall discuss further, multiple currencies. Accordingly, let us say:  
 CV = f (σFI, OPEN, DC, CU)             (2) 
where CV is consumption volatility, σ is a matrix of the variances of the relevant shocks, FI is 
international capital market integration (F for foreign), OPEN is trade openness, DC is domestic 
credit development (D for domestic) and CU is currency union.  
We then propose the following simple form of eq. (2) for estimation:  
 
CVit = a10 + a11 FIit + a12OPENit + a13DCit + a14CUit + Xit′a15 + a1t + ε1it           (3) 
In this estimation form, CV is the absolute percentage change in private consumption since the last 
period. FI is the average of the stock of gross foreign assets and gross foreign liabilities as a per-
centage of GDP, where foreign assets and liabilities are understood as the aggregate of portfolio 
equity investment, foreign direct investment, debt (including loans or trade credit), financial deriv-
atives and reserve assets (excluding gold). OPEN is the average of imports and exports of goods 
and services as a percentage of GDP. DC is an index or several indices of domestic credit devel-
opment, to be specified below. X comprises various indicators of the variances of the relevant 
shocks and other controls. i is a country index; t is a time index; and at is a set of time specific 
effects.  
 This specification calls for a series of comments. First, as a basic simplification, FI, OPEN, 
DC and CU appear only separately and not as joint products of the variances of the relevant 
shocks, which are all included in X. We shall return to this point subsequently.  
Next, X must be understood to contain some measure of the volatility of output if eq. (3) is 
to make sense. Without controlling for output movement, there would obviously be little hope of 
discerning any smoothing effects of FI, OPEN, CD and CU on consumption. To measure output 
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volatility, we use the absolute percentage movement in GDP. Besides this volatility, the volatility 
of the relative price of consumer goods and the real exchange rates should enter too in principle, 
as we have already indicated they will. In addition, taste shocks should enter. Indeed taste shocks 
might be especially important since unlike other shocks, there is no reason to think that they would 
be smoothed, even if they were temporary and even if the capital market were perfect. The life 
cycle hypothesis would suggest a number of possible indicators of such shocks. Also, in the ab-
sence of perfect Ricardian equivalence, movements in the tax burden should affect CV too.  All 
our measures of volatilities will be absolute percentage changes since the previous year.  Alterna-
tively, we tried standard deviations over 3 or 5 years instead of absolute annual percentage chang-
es. This cost some observations without changing the results notably. So we stuck to absolute 
percentage changes.  
The time specific effects at are crucial in eq. (3) too. They will absorb all symmetric 
movements in output growth in the entire country sample. By introducing them, we concentrate 
on the effects of asymmetric movements of output on consumption like the rest of the literature. 
Of course, in principle, at will capture all worldwide shocks, not only ones to output, like ones to 
saving preferences.   
 Some observations are also necessary about our measures of consumption and output. 
Sørensen et al. (2007) adjust their data for consumption and output for the consumer price index 
(CPI) and further use PPP-adjusted values of output. KPT (2009) apparently follow them. There 
is no fundamental difference here. We reflect the same issues by admitting the (volatility of the) 
price of consumption (the CPI) relative to the price of output (GDP) and the (volatility of the) 
PPP-adjusted real exchange rate as two separate controls. Thereby we allow shocks to both varia-
bles to enter the analysis separately, which we consider an advantage. Our procedure amounts to 
treating the value of consumption as depending on the value of output in different countries (in 
constant 1990 US dollar prices) without any attention to relative price movements and then admit-
ting two major sorts of cross-country differences in relative price movements as separate influ-
ences. Significantly too, common relative price movements and rises in the general price level in 
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the world are reflected separately in our specification in the time specific effects. On our reading, 
our specification agrees with the fine analysis of the issue in Hoffmann (2008). 
 The simplicity of our measure of FI also deserves discussion. Most authors make some 
distinctions, say, between assets and liabilities and/or between equities, loans and FDI. On this 
point, we made numerous experiments and found that no decompositions of cross-country portfo-
lios affected our conclusions about the impact of CU on consumption volatility. The separate parts 
of FI are always insignificant influences on CV and the decompositions never affect the results for 
CU.4  
Finally, rather than study different country groups separately, as KPT (2009) do, we exper-
iment widely with dummies for different country groupings in the sample as a whole  in order to 
enter more influences than usual in ASY-type of analysis. We prefer this use of dummies to split-
ting up the sample because the impact of many of the influences in our analysis depends principally 
(some of them exclusively) on cross-sectional variation and it is useful to keep the joint presence 
of as many countries as possible in the analysis.  
 
b. Completing the model 
Eq. (3) by itself cannot yield the influence of CU on CV since CU might also affect CV via 
FI, OPEN and DC. This calls for separate study of FI, OPEN and DC. In fact, we never examine 
the possible effect of CU via DC, perhaps wrongly since the prospect of EMU and its arrival might 
have accelerated domestic financial development in Finland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, all of 
which figure in our index of EMU. However, we do pay much attention to the indirect effects of 
CU via FI and OPEN. In the end, though, as already presaged, our results show no effect of FI on 
CV and only a negligible effect of OPEN on it. Yet this must not be allowed to blur the essential 
character of FI and OPEN in our study. We know from others’ work on these variables that we 
must expect a positive impact of CU on both of them. This impact would then matter with differ-
                                                        
4 The one notable outcome of our decompositions of FI is that separate consideration of equities (either on the asset 
or liability side) causes one of the domestic credit development variables in our analysis to bear a significant effect 
on consumption volatility. 
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ent results for CV. In addition, we use a different measure of CU and therefore our results for CU 
in the FI and OPEN equations cast essential light on the adequacy of our measure. This point is 
central too.   
 The following are our equations for FI and OPEN:  
 
FIit = a20 + a21 OPENit + a22DCit + a23CUit + Xit′a24 + a2t + ε2it             (4) 
 
OPENit = a30 + a31 FIit + a32DCit + a33CUit + Xit′a34 + a3t + ε3it             (5) 
The theoretical basis for both equations is fairly well known. As regards the impact of OPEN on 
FI, one fundamental factor at work, which LMF (2004) develop, is the inducement of importers to 
hold foreign assets as a hedge against changes in the terms of trade and the inducement of export-
ers to hold foreign liabilities as a similar hedge. In addition, exporters and importers have an incen-
tive to try to find home finance for their foreign clients and/or suppliers. Further, trade can spread 
knowledge of investment opportunities and thereby promote portfolio investment, both on the 
asset and the liability side.  Portes and Rey (2005) emphasize this last point (without any particular 
concern with whether FI boosts OPEN or the influence works the other way).  There is an earlier 
literature on the impact of geographical proximity on the composition of international portfolios 
(see Tesar and Werner (1995) and Ghosh and Wolf (2000)), which also clearly suggests a direct 
link going from trade to portfolio investment via first-hand knowledge and familiarity (cf. LMF 
(2003)).  
As concerns DC in eq. (4), domestic financial development could easily affect FI in either 
direction. On the one hand, domestic financial development should promote asset diversification 
and profit-seeking investment outside of national frontiers and thereby increase FI. On the other 
hand, by making credit easier to find at home, domestic financial development might well reduce 
foreign borrowing and thereby reduce FI.  
We would generally expect CU to promote FI on the usual grounds of lower transaction 
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costs, lower exchange risks,5 and associated reductions in legal and institutional barriers to in-
vestment.  
As for the controls X in eq. (4), legal interferences with the openness of capital markets 
should clearly enter. These interferences will plainly reduce FI, regardless what form they take (for 
example, minimal required holdings of home assets by home financial institutions). In addition, the 
status of some countries as international financial centers, like Ireland, the UK and Singapore, 
would evidently tend to magnify these countries’ foreign engagements. Also, in principle, business 
cycle correlations should matter. Higher positive correlations in expected returns between home 
and foreign investments should discourage foreign capital market engagements since they limit the 
opportunities for welfare-improving reductions in risk via international diversification (both on the 
asset and liability sides).  However, the volatilities of real and nominal exchange rates should work 
the other way and increase the incentive to cover and to spread exchange risk. 
With regard to OPEN and eq. (5), the grounds for a reciprocal positive effect of FI on 
OPEN are narrower than those for a positive effect of OPEN on FI in eq. (4) but they exist. The 
only ambiguity surrounds foreign direct investment (FDI), which can reduce OPEN by causing 
production to shift abroad and thereby lower exports. Even this negative effect, however, need not 
prevail since FDI can also spur exports of intermediary goods (parts) and induce fresh imports of 
formerly home-produced goods. FDI may also generate trade through entry into new fields of 
economic activity (cf. de Sousa and Lochard (2009)). With respect to all other parts of FI besides 
FDI, no similar ambiguity exists: the rest should promote OPEN through the earlier information 
channel.  Just as trade may breed foreign investment through learning, FI may breed learning of 
trade opportunities abroad.  
As regards DC, the effect on OPEN is unambiguously positive. Even if DC should facili-
tate home finance of foreign trade and thereby reduce FI, it should still promote foreign trade and 
                                                        
5The reference to exchange risk calls for some qualification since the elimination of some exchange rates via cur-
rency union removes some opportunities to spread the risk and thereby may raise the risk. However, currency union 
reduces the number of the remaining independent sources of possible exchange losses and this factor should domi-
nate.   
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have a positive effect on OPEN.  
In principle, CU should also bolster OPEN, not only by lowering transaction costs and ex-
change risk, as is also true in connection with FI, but through higher price transparency and uni-
formity of prices and competition.   
With regard to the controls X in eq. (5), the gravity model suggests a host of relevant 
country-specific factors, including geographical remoteness, output, population, land area, and 
geographical status as landlocked or an island. A high quality of roads, rails and telecommunica-
tions at home may also stimulate openness. Canning (1998) constructs a relevant index of infra-
structure, which Carrère et al. (2009) have updated and show to be highly significant in promoting 
foreign trade, or at least, bilateral trade. Finally, literacy, linguistic diversity at home and the size 
of immigrant populations may also matter in curtailing the tendency of foreign languages and in-
formation costs to limit foreign trade (Melitz (2008)).  
In general, we shall be most interested in the results about CU after dividing up the variable 
in two parts: EMU, or CUE, and the rest, or CUX. This will allow conclusions about EMU as 
such and the separate importance of the deeper monetary integration that this system entails. In the 
other numerous instances of CU, the adoption of a common currency is often unilateral and never 
signifies the presence of a joint central bank with considerable powers and political independence. 
In so far as CUE is a factor, it will also be important to check whether the true source of the influ-
ence is not really membership in the EU, since the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty could pro-
mote cross-holdings of assets and liabilities independently of a single money.  
 
III. Econometric Issues 
If we view eqs. (3), (4) and (5) as a system, the model poses some basic problems of esti-
mation since the dependent variable in eq. (3), CV, can be expected to increase the variance of 
output or the business cycle, OPEN affects FI in eq. (4) and FI affects OPEN in eq. (5). We will 
deal with these problems in the econometric analysis by instrumenting the absolute percentage 
 15 
change of output in eq. (3), OPEN in eq. (4), and FI in eq. (5). (We also ran tests without instru-
menting and using lagged values instead.) Following, we will resort to single-equation GMM esti-
mates of all three equations. This estimation method is efficient for arbitrary heteroskedas-ticity. 
(Specifically, we used the STATA routine ivreg2, owing to Baum et al. (2003).) That is the meth-
od’s advantage over 2SLS. As for the instruments, we include the lagged value of the dependent 
variable in all 3 equations: specifically, the once-lagged value in eq. (3) (where the first lag already 
refers to data two periods earlier) and the twice-lagged values in eqs. (4) and (5). We will use rest-
of-world output volatility as an instrument for output volatility in eq. (3) and the country-specific 
gravity variables will serve for various instruments for OPEN in eq. (4). All the instruments (and 
their lag lengths) are listed in the notes to the tables. These instruments include other variables 
(and their lags) besides the ones mentioned in this paragraph.6  
It may be important too to explain our preference for GMM-IV over 3SLS since 3SLS is 
superior in taking into account the covariance matrix in the disturbances in the stochastic part of 
our model. We have two reasons for this preference. First, 3SLS would assume homoskedasticity 
(just as 2SLS does). Second, it would allow each equation to be affected by imprecision in the 
estimates of the other two. This last problem particularly impresses us since CV has no reciprocal 
effect on FI and OPEN in the structural part of our model. Therefore, we see no econometric 
ground for allowing errors in the estimates of FI and OPEN to affect the estimates of CV.7  
In the subsequent presentation, we report results for as large a set of country-year observa-
tions as we can for our three equations. The coverage is not identical for all three equations mainly 
because of differences in the instruments but also because of greater data limitations for some ex-
planatory variables than others. Therefore, we also examine what happens if we limit the dataset to 
                                                        
6 Compare Aviat and Courdacier (2007) who estimated bilateral versions of eqs. (4) and (5) and who also consider 
cross-country holdings of claims a function of bilateral trade and bilateral trade a function of cross-country claims. 
They similarly use instruments to handle the resulting econometric issues (though they prefer 2SLS). Of course, the 
gravity variables that serve them as instruments for trade in the capital-market equation necessarily differ from 
ours, since these variables are necessarily bilateral ones: for example, distance rather than remoteness and common 
language rather than linguistic diversity.  
7 See also Hayashi (2000, pp. 273-274) for a detailed discussion of the advantages of single-equation GMM estima-
tion. 
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a uniform set of country-year predicted outcomes. Regarding FI and OPEN, this cuts down the 
number of observations moderately whereas in the case of CV, it reduces the number of countries 
in the sample from 125 to 91 and curtails the number of predicted outcomes commensurably. For 
this reason, we shall present the results for CV separately (in an appendix). This separate presenta-
tion is not necessary for FI and OPEN, as the results hardly change. In all our estimates, we cor-
rect the standard errors for clustering by country. 
Finally, a word is needed about our treatment of CU as an independent variable. As de-
fined, CU varies over time with trade with currency union partners. Our model says that CU may 
affect aggregate trade. A fortiori, it may then affect bilateral trade with union partners. Conse-
quently, CU may be endogenous. In response, we experimented with a constant value for CU by 
country for the positive values. We took this constant to be the average over the periods of con-
secutive positive values and zero for the rest of the time.8 Regression results with the time-varying 
and time-constant versions of CU show that the two measures yield indistinguishable results in all 
three equations. Thus, the effect of our CU variable is entirely cross-sectional and not time-
dependent in the estimates. Notwithstanding, we shall adopt the time-constant measure.9 Finally, 
we found it useful to combine the use of CUE with a dummy variable for the EMU members for 
1999, 2000, and 2001 in order better to distinguish the effect of EMU, which begins in 1999, from 
the effect of EU membership, which goes back earlier to 1993. (The dummy has no importance in 
any other connection.) It can also be argued that EMU only fully came with the arrival of the euro 
as a currency in 2002. 
IV. The data  
                                                        
8 In principle, this measure may be oversimplified since it fails to take into account the possibility of widely differ-
ent orders of magnitude for positive values at different times. But France is the only example of note. For this coun-
try, CU is small and positive prior to entry into EMU in 1999 and high afterwards. We therefore adopted two sepa-
rate positive averages of CU for France: a small positive one before 1999 and a large positive one afterwards. In-
deed we had no choice since a single average for France over the entire study period would have muddied our 
measure of CUE. 
9 In addition, we performed a χ2 C-test (or difference-in-Sargan) to see whether the data supports the null hypothe-
sis of the exogeneity of this variable. (See Hayashi (2000, p. 220) for the definition of the test statistic.) For all our 
basic equations, the constructed CU variable is exogenous in our model.  
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We start with a large panel of data for the period 1980-2006 covering as many as 180 
countries for some series.  The basic source of our data is the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI).  The relevant series for output, private and public consumption and exports and 
imports in this dataset are in US dollars at constant 1990 prices.  We also employ the data on in-
ternational financial integration in the LMF (2006) dataset. The authors provided us an updated 
version of their data going through 2007. All relevant variables in this database are calculated as 
ratios of GDP.  The Beck et al (2009) database on financial structure gave us our different 
measures of domestic capital market development.  For the PPP-adjusted real exchange rates, we 
resort to the Penn World Tables.10 As concerns restrictions on capital account, we choose the 
Chinn-Ito de jure index among the available measures (Chinn and Ito (2007)).  The index is con-
tinuous and based on the information in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions.  Separate definitions and sources of the variables in the econometric analy-
sis appear in Appendix A.   
As indicated, only 125 at most of our 180 countries remain in our estimates and do so only 
in the case of eq. (3). In the other two equations, hardly more than 100 remain. Only 91 of these 
are uniformly present in all 3 equations. We list the 125 countries that enter in eq. (3) and signal 
the 91 that are uniformly present in Appendix B, where we also provide the data for CU for the 
EMU members and the corresponding data for EU (which will be explained shortly) for the coun-
tries that have been members of the EU since the onset of EMU in 1999.  
V. Test Results 
 Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide the results of our GMM-IV estimates for FI, OPEN and CV re-
spectively. In each case, we also present an OLS estimate for comparison. In discussing these re-
sults, we begin with eqs. (4) and (5) rather than eq. (3) for CV, since this ordering makes more 
sense as FI and OPEN enter as influences on CV while the reverse is not true. The instruments for 
                                                        
10Our reason for relying principally on the WDI rather than the Penn tables for GDP and related variables is that 
the LMF and Beck et al data, on which our FI and DC variables depend, use the WDI series in calculating ratios of 
GDP. 
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the different GMM estimates within any given table are always the same. The diagnostic tests for 
the validity and relevance of the instruments generally indicate that we do not face under-
identification of our equations or suffer from weak instruments. As regards weak identification, we 
report the Wald F statistic for the first-stage regressions in all cases and we examined its value 
against those tabulated in Stock and Yogo (2005) (which we do not report) for different signifi-
cance levels.  There is never evidence of a problem.11  The Sargan-Hansen J test of overidenti-
fying restrictions serves us to evaluate the validity of our instrument set, i.e., whether the excluded 
instruments are independent of the error process.  The results are reported in the tables, and the P-
values indicate that we fail to reject the null hypothesis.  We turn to the estimates next.  
a. Financial integration  
As seen in column 1, Table 1, the positive influence of OPEN on FI comes out clearly. 
Since both variables are in logs, the elasticity of influence is .65. This is a large effect, which we 
found to be persistent across different specifications. The next two influences in column 1 are 
those of the indices of domestic credit development that appeared consistently significant in our 
many earlier experiments with the financial variables in the Beck et al (2009) database. One of 
these is the (log of) the ratio of liquid liabilities of the financial sector (inclusive of banks, bank-like 
and non-bank financial institutions) to GDP and the other is the (log of) the ratio of deposit money 
bank liabilities to total bank (including central bank) assets. Both measures are also prominent in 
the work of the main architects, Beck et al. (2000, 2009). The former enters with a positive sign; 
the latter with a negative one. Both signs agree with theory since, as noted before, domestic finan-
cial development should promote foreign asset holdings while greater ability to borrow domesti-
cally should reduce foreign borrowing.12  
                                                        
11 The results from the first-stage regressions are not reported but available from the authors upon request.  The 
Wald F statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) ‘rk’ version and is robust in the presence of clustering, heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. 
12 In order to confirm both interpretations, we made separate experiments with gross foreign assets and gross for-
eign liabilities as the measure of FI instead of the average of the two. As expected, in the estimate for assets, the 
ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP enters still more significantly with the same sign while the second measure be-
comes insignificant. In the estimate for liabilities, the precise opposite happens. Note also that the coefficients of 
the two indicators of financial development are not directly comparable with one another even though both of them 
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The next variable in column 1, ADVANCED, is a dummy for advanced countries for which 
LMF (2003, 2008) make a strong case. It yields nothing (the distinction between emerging and 
poor countries does not either). Yet if we restrict the sample to the more recent half of our study 
period, starting in 1994, ADVANCED does become extremely significant, as we will see below. 
Therefore, a fundamental evolution took place, in accordance with LMF (2008).13  The next two 
variables in column 1 display the positive effect of financial centers and freedom of capital move-
ments on FI. As regards freedom of capital movements, as mentioned, we use the de jure measure 
of Chinn and Ito (2006), which is continuous and time-varying (and where higher values mean 
more freedom). Both variables enter highly significantly.   
The next two variables pertain to portfolio risk. The estimate in column 1 confirms the theo-
retical implication that countries whose output is highly positively correlated with output in the 
rest of the world have fewer opportunities for profitable risk diversification. The (log of the) cor-
relation enters with the correct negative sign.14 The last variable, real exchange rate volatility, also 
enters significantly with the right positive sign. We measure this volatility as the (log of the) abso-
lute annual percentage change in the real exchange rate. But the same result holds if we measure it 
instead as the standard deviation of this rate of change over the current and 2 or 4 previous years. 
We lagged the last 2 variables, relating to portfolio risk; this matters for volatility but not for the 
correlation coefficient which is just as significant without a lag.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
are ratios, since they have different denominators. If we set the averages of the two indicators the same (in the esti-
mated form or in logs), so that they become of comparable dimension, the elasticity of influence of the first is about 
1 and 2/3 as large as the second. At .19, the first one’s elasticity of influence is also much smaller than that of trade 
openness (.65). These last two figures are directly comparable since both variables are divided by GDP.     
13ADVANCED consists of the same 21 countries that KPT (2009) term ‘industrial’ plus Iceland: that is, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ja-
pan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the UK and the US. Note that if 
we use either output or output per capita − both continuous variables − instead of the dummy ADVANCED to con-
trol for level of development, nothing significant ever emerges, even for the 1992-2006 period.   
14 This result follows after limiting the measure of correlations to values of .80 and higher, which essentially means 
omitting some tiny and exceptionally poor places, or war-torn countries of Africa, or, finally, the newborn market 
economies following the collapse of the Soviet Union (compare Bai and Zhang (2007) and Kehoe and Perri (2004)). 
By thus restricting the analysis to correlations of .8 or higher, we only lose around 80 observations (less than 5 
percent). 
15 It bears note that including the volatility of the real exchange rate means dropping the US from the estimate since 
all exchange rate movements are relative to the US dollar. We tested and found that if we exclude the exchange rate 
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We come at last to the variable of special interest, CU, which shows a highly significant effect 
of currency union. As this effect is a semi-elasticity, the elasticity of influence of CU on FI is the 
exponential of 1.31 minus one and is extremely high, around 2.7. It is interesting to compare this 
effect with those of Financial Center and the Chinn-Ito index.  All three measures are semi-
elasticities, but CU goes from zero to 1 (described as 0-1 in the tables), Financial Center is a bina-
ry 0,1 term, and the Chinn-Ito measure is a continuous one going from ‒ 1.8 to 2.6. If we correct 
for these differences in units, currency union appears to have the same order of impact as freedom 
of capital movements, but the impacts of both are far smaller than that of status as a financial cen-
ter. The latter’s influence is about 4 times greater than that of the two former (all in terms of semi-
elasticities).16  
Column 2 provides a pooled OLS estimate of the previous equation. The coefficient of open-
ness drops from .65 to .53, which is just what we would expect from negative bias coming from 
the positive reverse effect of FI on OPEN.  Otherwise, the results are much the same except that 
the coefficients are less precisely estimated on the whole. 
The remaining three estimates in column 1 probe more deeply into the impact of CU. The 
next one, column 3, shows that the influence of CU on FI stems more clearly from the EMU 
members than the rest. Once we divide CU between EMU members and the rest, the precision of 
the estimate of CU for the EMU members, CUE, doubles while the estimate for the rest, CUX, 
drops and remains barely significant at the 10% level. This suggests that the deeper monetary inte-
gration in EMU is important and leads to a larger, better defined positive effect. But the interpre-
tation needs corroboration. With the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 and the arrival of EU, the earlier 
provisions of the Single Market Act of 1987 calling for more capital market integration (more 
factor mobility, the right of establishment and the absence of capital controls) became more firmly 
founded in law. This could then be the crux of the matter.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
variable and thereby restore the US in the estimate, the rest of the coefficients are virtually unchanged. The US will 
remain in the estimates of the other two equations that we report.  
16 In order to draw these comparisons, we add 1.8 to the Chinn-Ito measure to make it non-negative like the other 
two and then we compare the three coefficients at the means of the positive values (therefore for the respective 
averages of positive values for Chinn-Ito and CU and for 1 for Financial Center).  
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To investigate, we constructed an EU variable exactly on the same lines as the CU one: 
that is, based on the percentage of trade of members of the EU with the rest relative to total trade 
with everyone. We then introduced this next variable after the same use of averages as before for 
CU in order to mitigate the problem of endogeneity. The results are in column 4. The impact of 
CUE drops but remains high and very significant while CUX is not affected. This last result fits 
well with Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) who similarly test the importance of EMU as opposed to 
EU membership in promoting capital market integration (based on bilateral evidence). If we base 
ourselves on the estimates of the influence of currency union in the previous column, 4, rather than 
column 1, as we are prone to do, the right single-value coefficient is around 1 rather than 1.31 
(column 1) and the elasticity of influence of CU on FI is closer to 1.8, which is still high though 
lower than before (when it was around 2.7). This unitary coefficient also corresponds to a semi-
elasticity of influence about 10% lower than that of freedom of capital movements and around 
one-fifth as high as that of status as a financial center.      
 The last estimate shows what happens if we limit the study period to the Maastricht period 
of 1994-2006 (where we lag the start of the period one year). For this sub-period, experiments 
show that CUE and EU cannot enter together and we retained CUE, the more important of the 
two both in size of influence and statistical significance. A number of the coefficients are notably 
affected. But the only significant influence that disappears is that of volatility of the real exchange 
rate. Further, as presaged, ADVANCED becomes highly significant. Of considerable note, the 
influence of CUE is unaffected.  
 In closing, let us emphasize our finding of the same impact of EMU on capital market inte-
gration that many others have reported. This is important support for the reliability of our measure 
of EMU and our measure of CU more generally. We clearly study the same influences. 
    
b. Trade openness 
Consider next the estimates of OPEN in eq. (5) in Table 2. In this case, we lag all of the fi-
nancial stock variables since they are end-of-period values, and by lagging them one period, we 
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effectively use beginning-of-period values, or more exactly in the case of FI and the liquid-
liabilities indicator of DC, a beginning-of-period one divided by previous-year GDP.   
As seen, FI shows up with a significant positive effect on OPEN. Its coefficient is less than 
half as high as the one for the reverse effect of OPEN on FI in eq. (4), which accords with our 
theoretical discussion. This weaker effect of FI on OPEN than OPEN on FI also agrees with Aviat 
and Coeurdacier (2007), in whose work the size and relative order of the two influences looms 
large. Of the two indices of domestic credit development only the ratio of private bank deposits to 
total bank assets continues to enter significantly as before in the FI equation. Of note, though low-
ering foreign borrowing, this last ratio boosts foreign trade, in accordance with theory. The next 
variable, output, is a familiar one in trade equations, which is why we use it instead of 
ADVANCED (as the two clearly interfere with one another). Of interest, the introduction of out-
put as an explanatory variable in eq. (5) can be interpreted as a test of the hypothesis of unitary 
elasticity of influence of home output on trade (since OPEN equals trade divided by output). In 
that case, the insignificance of output in the first column can be read as confirming an imposed 
restriction of a unitary elasticity of influence. We lagged output like the two financial variables for 
no fundamental reason; this makes no difference.   
As regards the country-specific gravity variables, except for population, the only ones we 
show − namely, (log of) land area, literacy and linguistic diversity − enter significantly with the 
right theoretical signs. (Remoteness, landlocked, island and quality of infrastructure prove insignif-
icant.) Land area (in logs) reflects internal distance and should reduce foreign trade. Literacy 
should promote foreign trade by increasing the ability to cope with the special linguistic problems 
associated with foreign trade, including translation. Linguistic diversity, in turn, should increase 
foreign trade by reducing the ability to avoid linguistic problems by trading at home. The one in-
significant variable we retain, population (in logs), enters with the right negative sign. Larger pop-
ulation size implies wider opportunities to trade at home and avoid the costs of foreign trade. In-
cluding the population variable seems right since the sole reason for its insignificance in the equa-
tion is the presence of output, an insignificant variable. If we remove output, the negative coeffi-
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cient of population becomes large and highly significant (as we do not show).   
 The next result of column 1 in Table 2 says that currency union has no direct effect at all 
on trade openness. This result holds for CUE as well as CUX. Theory led us to expect a signifi-
cant positive sign. Quite notably, however, CU does raise trade in the model, but exclusively by 
increasing FI, which in turn raises OPEN. Based on column 4 of Table 1 together with column 1 
of Table 2, the elasticity of influence of membership in the EMU on OPEN via FI is about .50 
(exp(1.02)−1 × .28 ≅ .50). This estimate is also statistically highly significant. Thus, widening 
membership in EMU sufficiently to increase trade with other members by one percent relative to 
total trade will raise openness in the membership by half of one percent.17 As indicated before, the 
result has some wider interest since it implies that the positive impact of EMU on OPEN comes 
exclusively via capital markets and through international portfolio diversification and not via the 
channels that are usually taken for granted (without particular investigation) in the Rose literature: 
namely, reductions in trade frictions and increases in price transparency and competition in goods 
markets. In addition, the result emerges clearly only for EMU (for CUE), not for EU generally, 
and therefore only for the wider degree of monetary integration that this system entails.18  
The next estimate, column 2, offers a pooled OLS estimate of the one in column 1.  The 
results are little different except that the influence of literacy is no longer visible. In addition, the 
coefficient of FI is unaffected, contrary to the expectation that it would drop because of simultane-
ity bias.  
In the last column of Table 2, we repeat the estimate in column 1 over 1994-2006 alone. It 
now appears that the influence of output on trade is mildly less than unitary. Otherwise little 
change of any note takes place. 
 
c. Consumption smoothing 
 We come to the main part of our empirical results, concerning consumption smoothing. 
                                                        
17 If we remove FI from column 1 and then re-estimate, the coefficient of CUE rises to .40 and becomes significant 
with an implied elasticity of ≅ .50. Thus, we get the same result. 
18 True, it remains to be separately shown that the result holds for bilateral trade, or the focus of the Rose literature, 
though this is clearly implicit.  
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Let us observe at the start that we made some experiments with several more sophisticated formu-
lations than eq. (3). Transitory movements in output should disturb consumption less than perma-
nent ones, since it should be possible to smooth their effects on consumption through borrowing 
whereas it should not be possible to do the same for permanent movements (see inter alia, ASY 
(1996) and prominently in more recent work, Artis and Hoffmann (2008)). Therefore we tried 
distinguishing permanent and transitory movements of output. The permanent and transitory 
movements do prove separately significant and of the right relative order but the difference be-
tween the estimates of the two is not significant. Therefore we neglect the point. Next, we tried 
either adding cross-product terms for FI and DC and output volatility or substituting such product 
terms for FI and the two indicators of DC in eq. (3), in accordance with the general principle, in 
eq. (2), that both financial variables’ effects on CV should be conditional on the business cycle. (In 
these experiments we instrumented output volatility in the same way as in the rest of the estimates 
of CV.)  However, the results provide no more support for the hypothesis of cross-product effects 
than for the simplified formulation in eq. (3). In addition, using the product terms does not alter 
the rest of the CV equation or any of the conclusions. Therefore, we report strictly on the simpli-
fied eq. (3). 
 In our estimates in Table 3, we begin without introducing CU. Column 1 shows that a one 
percent movement in output results in about a 0.68 of one percent movement in consumption. This 
implies that .32 of the output movement has no repercussion on consumption and is certainly con-
sistent with some major smoothing of output shocks. We will come back to this point. The next 
four variables in this equation, OPEN, FI and our two measures of CD appear with a one-year lag. 
Very significantly, the level of international financial diversification, FI, has no discernible tenden-
cy to stabilize consumption at all, and OPEN has the opposite one of destabilizing it. One percent 
of extra trade openness (lagged) increases CV by .007 of one percent. In addition, both of our 
indices of financial development are totally insignificant. Status as an advanced country, the next 
variable, arguably has some positive effect on consumption smoothing (a negative effect on CV) 
but below conventional significance levels (at 13%).  
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 The next two variables in column 1 are the only two reflections of shocks besides output 
volatility that prove significant in our tests. We tried the other variables suggested by our theoreti-
cal discussion of the matrix of variances σ in eq. (2). Specifically, we experimented with move-
ments in ratios of employment to labor, labor force participation rates, sex ratios in the labor force, 
and ratios of population 0 to 14 and 65 and over to total population. All of these variables emerge 
as insignificant. Our experiments with volatility of nominal and real exchange rates also failed (as 
Ravn (2001) and Kollmann (2009) would have led us to expect). 
 In the case of the first of our two volatility influences that gave satisfactory results, the one 
relating to government financing, our particular measure needs explanation. Of the available series, 
the most appropriate one, in theory, would seem to be the ratio of tax revenues to GDP. However, 
the series for this ratio in the World Bank database shortened in recent years and only begins 
mostly since 1995 and often only since 2000, whereas when Henisz (2004) made his broad inter-
national study of policy volatility not so long ago the same database permitted him to begin as far 
back as 1971. To the best of our ability to determine why, the answer lies in a switch of series for 
government finance from a cash basis to an accruals basis, beginning in the middle nineties in some 
countries, in the early 2000s in others, and still to come in the rest. On the other hand, the series 
for government consumption as a percentage of GDP remains unbroken. Further, for the limited 
period where we were able to use both series, the two give corresponding results and, if com-
bined, clearly interfere with one another. It would seem therefore that the government consump-
tion series is an acceptable alternative and all things considered the better choice.19  As seen, a one 
percent movement in the government-consumption-output ratio will produce a movement in con-
                                                        
19 Fatas and Mihov (2008) also argue for favoring the government consumption measure to the one for total gov-
ernment revenues (or for government expenditures) in a broad international study of government influence, perhaps 
more strongly than we do. They maintain that the government consumption series are more comparable interna-
tionally and less subject to breaks and definitional changes (for periods where both series exist). Of interest too, in 
his early attempt to test the theoretical implication of perfect risk sharing by examining the extent to which domes-
tic private consumption can be explained by aggregate world consumption and is independent of idiosyncratic 
movement of home output, Obstfeld (1994) argued for removing government consumption entirely from output, as 
well as private and public investment, on the grounds that consumers can only share risks of output changes for the 
remainder through portfolio diversification. Corcoran (2007) adopts Obstfeld’s view.  This would certainly argue 
for paying attention to government consumption in the analysis. 
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sumption of .17 of one percent.  
 The other volatility series that yields satisfactory results concerns the price of consumption 
(CPI) relative to the price of GDP. A one percent movement in this relative price raises CV by .l6 
of one percent.  
 In column 2, we proceed to introduce CUE, the indicator of EMU, and CUX, the indicator 
of other currency unions. As seen, CUE emerges as significant with a negative sign, implying a 
stabilizing effect. The elasticity of influence is small, about .02, but the effect is robust, as we 
found through many trials with different specifications (omitting variables, adding variables and 
choosing different instruments for output volatility).  
 The following estimate, column 3, is a pooled OLS one of the preceding. The coefficient of 
output volatility goes down to .48, in line with expectations since we no longer correct for the 
positive reciprocal effect of consumption volatility on output volatility. Otherwise, little changes 
except that the influence of CUE rises perceptibly and becomes more significant while the influ-
ence of the volatility of the price of consumption relative to the price of output disappears.   
 The next three estimates are the most important ones in the table. In column 4, we add the 
index of the EU. Now CUE becomes totally insignificant, just like CUX, while EU appears as sig-
nificant instead. Everything else is the same as in column 2. However, the dominance of EU over 
CUE could stem entirely from the pre-1999 period when EMU had not yet appeared since in the 
subsequent period the two influences partly merge. To investigate this matter, we break up EU 
into two parts, before and after 1999 (using separate averages of bilateral trade relative to total 
trade in the two sub-periods for the two measures), and we successively combine pre-1999 EU 
with post-1999 EU (column 5) and with CUE instead (column 6). As we see from column 5, in 
the first experiment EU is fairly equally significant pre- and post-1999. However, in column 6, 
where EMU (CUE) replaces post-1999 EU, the impact of CUE is more marked than that of post-
1999 EU in the preceding column, and in addition the impact of CUE is stronger and better esti-
mated than that of the EU pre-1999. Thus, the comparison favors EMU over post-1999 EU. We 
made a number of separate experiments with different specifications and instruments in columns 
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(5) and (6) to check the robustness of this result and these experiments clearly support CUE over 
post-1999 EU and the higher impact of CUE than pre-1999 EU.  Thus, we conclude that while the 
EU may have promoted consumption smoothing prior to EMU, EMU bolstered this influence.   
 A couple of further robustness tests will close the analysis. In column 7, we repeat the es-
timate of our favored equation, column 6, for 1994-2006. There is remarkably little change though 
the significance of both EMU and EU membership drops mildly and the latter only remains signifi-
cant at the .102 level.  The last robustness test repeats all of the previous estimates of CV in table 
3 for the smaller dataset yielding predicted values for a common set of country/years (or a com-
mon set over all three equations). As mentioned earlier, the number of countries in this case falls 
from 125 to 91. The predicted values of CV also drop commensurately. The results are in Appen-
dix C. The estimates agree with the earlier ones rather well.    
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 In this work, we adopt a different methodological approach to the study of the impact of 
EMU on consumption smoothing. Rather than relying on inferences based on the behavior of con-
sumption levels or growth, we focus on consumption volatility and therefore on smoothing more 
directly. This research strategy overcomes a fundamental ambiguity in the usual approach. By 
promoting cross-country property claims, EMU may help disconnect consumption from idiosyn-
cratic behavior of output and in this fashion smooth consumption, as the usual approach says. But 
by the same token, EMU may also tie consumption more closely to idiosyncratic output shocks in 
the rest of world, where elsewhere depending on the particular national investment pattern, and 
thereby it may destabilize consumption. Moreover, this ambiguity matters to a heightened degree 
in our study period of 1980-2006 since trade and capital market liberalization took place in the 
mid-eighties and was followed by a surge of gross foreign investment. This last surge might well 
have been aimed principally to exploit profit opportunities, even at the cost of higher risk, rather 
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than to diversify risks. Furthermore, output shocks are not the only ones to consider. The increase 
in international diversification could also have modified the dynamics of price and wealth move-
ments and thereby the responses of consumption to all shocks, not only asymmetric supply ones. 
Evidently EMU could have contributed to all these developments. These are then our reasons for 
centering the analysis on consumption smoothing, and in close association, for admitting more 
sources of influence. 
 The results are interesting. We find that output volatility does not lead to corresponding 
volatility of consumption, in broad agreement with ASY-type of results. According to our esti-
mates, about 32 percent of output movement has no repercussion on consumption. Thus, some 
significant smoothing of output shocks takes place. However, the cross-country holding of assets 
and liabilities, as such, does not contribute to stabilizing consumption. Accordingly, even though 
we also find the same strong effect of EMU on cross-country property claims that others’ work 
had led us to expect, our estimates imply that no consumption smoothing follows. Yet EMU does 
show up as increasing consumption smoothing independently of cross-country property claims and 
trade. Since we control for real exchange rates and the price of consumption goods relative to 
other goods, we attribute this smoothing to an increase in the tradability of goods. In particular, 
EMU membership could have facilitated the acquisition of credit and insurance at home and in-
creased the tradability of home capital (including the human form) through more foreign price 
competition, more contestable home markets and greater harmonization of regulations. In this 
way, EMU might have promoted consumption smoothing apart from any international portfolio 
diversification or trade in goods. This could also have happened partly through EU membership 
aside from EMU. But according to our results, EMU notably added to the effect. Obviously, fur-
ther corroboration would be desirable. The crash of 2007-2009, if allowed to come in, would 
clearly raise new issues that may eventually need to be treated as well.  
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TABLE 1 Financial Integration (log): 
 GMM-IV 
(1) 
Pooled OLS    
(2) 
GMM-IV 
(3) 
GMM-IV 
(4) 
GMM-IV (5) 
1994-2006 
OPEN : Trade Openness (log) 0.651
*** 
(0.07) 
0.533*** 
(0.08) 
0.649*** 
(0.07) 
0.637*** 
(0.07) 
0.601*** 
(0.07) 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP (log) 0.191
*** 
(0.06) 
0.151** 
(0.071) 
0.189*** 
(0.057) 
0.195*** 
(0.06) 
0.1094* 
(0.0636) 
Deposits / Total Bank (incl. 
Central Bank) Assets (log) 
-0.408*** 
(0.07) 
-0.366*** 
(0.08) 
-0.405*** 
(0.07) 
-0.399*** 
(0.07) 
-0.180*** 
(0.053) 
ADVANCED (0, 1) 0.057 
(0.09) 
0.027 
(0.11) 
0.056 
(0.09) 
0.016 
(0.09) 
.361*** 
(0.094) 
Financial Center (0, 1) 0.985
*** 
(0.18) 
1.040*** 
(0.16) 
0.988*** 
(0.18) 
0.945*** 
(0.18) 
1.101*** 
(0.10) 
Chinn-Ito Index 0.111
*** 
(0.026) 
0.103*** 
(0.03) 
0.108*** 
(0.025) 
0.107*** 
(0.025) 
0.176*** 
(0.025) 
Correlation of home output 
with ROW (.8-1) (log, lagged) 
-2.95*** 
(0.74) 
-2.373*** 
(0.947) 
-2.940*** 
(0.74) 
-2.986*** 
(0.735) 
-3.822*** 
(0.873) 
Absolute value of exchange 
rate depreciation (log, lagged) 
0.0136* 
(0.0077) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.0134* 
(0.0077) 
0.0128* 
(0.0077) 
0.0045 
(0.10) 
CU: Currency Union (0-1) 1.31
*** 
(0.27) 
1.276*** 
(0.32) 
 
 
  
CUE: EMU (0-1)   1.340
*** 
(0.12) 
1.023*** 
(0.15) 
1.060*** 
(0.126) 
CUX: CU outside EMU  (0-1)   1.053* 
(0.63) 
1.060* 
(0.64) 
0.889* 
(0.535) 
Maastricht Treaty (0-1)    0.358
*** 
(0.13) 
 
Observations 1783 1975 1783 1783 981 
Number of countries 91 101 91 91 91 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald F-statistic (first-stage 
regression ) 
2621.87 
 
 2750.52 
 
2777.39 
 
1308.22 
 
Sargan-Hansen J Statistic 
(p-value) 
      14.4 
(0.21) 
        14.3 
(0.22) 
       14.57 
(0.20) 
        12.09 
(0.36) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the measure of financial integration in LML (2007) and is computed from total assets and liabilities available in their 
study.  The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are corrected for clusters across country observations, and robust to heteroskedasticity.  GMM-IV 
is the generalized method of moments estimator.  The instruments for OPEN are twice-lagged values of OPEN, once- and twice-lagged values of liquid 
liabilities and bank deposits ratios, lagged values of population, and remoteness, land area, landlocked, island, literacy and  linguistic diversity. The 
Wald F statistic, from the first-stage regression, is a test of weak identification, and the tabulated values in Stock and Yogo (2005) (not shown) indicate 
the different significant levels.  The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions.  Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-
square.  P-values are reported in the parenthesis.  The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero respectively 
at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level of significance. 
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TABLE 2 Trade Openness (log): 
 GMM-IV (1) Pooled OLS (2) GMM-IV (3) 
1994-2006 
FI : Financial Integration (log, lagged) 0.277
*** 
(0.06) 
0.277*** 
(0.06) 
0.223*** 
(0.07) 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP (log, lagged) -0.011 
(0.07) 
0.099 
(0.09) 
0.017 
(0.08) 
Deposits / Total Bank (incl. Central Bank) 
Money  Assets (log, lagged) 
0.431*** 
(0.06) 
0.386*** 
(0.10) 
0.417*** 
(0.09) 
Output (log, lagged) -0.054
 
(0.035) 
-0.055 
(0.06) 
-0.083*** 
(0.03) 
Population (log, lagged) -0.053 
(0.04) 
-0.085 
(0.06) 
-0.036 
(0.04) 
Area (log) -0.087
*** 
(0.02) 
-0.061* 
(0.031) 
-0.078*** 
(0.03) 
Literacy rate (0-1) 0.573
** 
(0.24) 
0.453 
(0.39) 
0.908*** 
(0.24) 
Language diversity (0-1) 0.185
* 
(0.109) 
0.252* 
(0.15) 
0.281** 
(0.12) 
CUE: EMU (0-1) -0.229 
(0.17) 
-0.088 
(0.20) 
-0.096 
(0.18) 
CUX : CU outside EMU (0-1) -0.025 
(0.37) 
-0.060 
(0.37) 
-0.063 
(0.48) 
Observations 1836 2241 1082 
Number of countries 93 101 93 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.54  
Wald F statistic first-stage regression      1107.80  941.14 
Sargan-Hansen J Statistic 
(p-value) 
11.28 
(0.26) 
 8.39 
(0.50) 
Notes: The dependent variable is trade openness as measured by the average of the ratio of exports and imports to 
GDP.  The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are corrected for clusters across country observations, and ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity.  GMM-IV is the generalized method of moments estimator.  The instruments for (lagged) 
FI are twice-lagged values of FI, twice- and thrice-lagged values of liquid liabilities and bank deposits ratios, lagged 
values of output correlations and the Chinn-Ito index, and remoteness, landlocked and island.  The Wald F statistic, 
from the first-stage regression, is a test of weak identification, and the tabulated values in Stock and Yogo (2005) 
(not shown) indicate the different significant levels.  The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of over-identifying re-
strictions.  Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-square.  P-values are reported in the parenthesis. 
The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero respectively at the 1% , 
5%, and 10% level of significance. 
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TABLE 3 Consumption Smoothing: 
 GMM-IV (1) GMM-IV (2) Pooled OLS (3) GMM-IV (4) 
Output Volatility  0.681
*** 
(0.08) 
0.657*** 
(0.08) 
0.480*** 
(0.09) 
0.659*** 
(0.08) 
OPEN: Trade Openness (log, 
lagged) 
0.007*** 
(0.0021) 
0.007*** 
(0.0021) 
 0.0076** 
(0.0029) 
0.007*** 
(0.0021) 
FI: Financial Integration 
(log, lagged) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP (log, 
lagged) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Deposits to Total Bank (incl. 
Central Bank) Assets (log, 
lagged) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
ADVANCED (0, 1) -0.0051 
(0.0034) 
-0.0041 
(0.0033) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Volatility of Government 
Consumption 
0.172*** 
(0.03) 
0.174*** 
(0.03) 
0.198*** 
(0.06) 
0.174*** 
(0.03) 
Volatility of the ratio of CPI 
to GDP deflator (lagged) 
0.162** 
(0.064) 
0.162** 
(0.0643) 
0.151 
(0.126) 
0.162** 
(0.064) 
CUE: EMU (0-1)  -0.0229
*** 
(0.007) 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
-0.0129 
(0.009) 
CUX: CU outside EMU (0-1)  0.0173 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.023) 
0.017 
(0.02) 
Maastricht Treaty (0-1)     -0.0125
** 
(0.0058) 
Observations 2248 2248 2397 2248 
Number of countries 125 125 125 125 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared   0.27  
Wald  F statistic first-stage 
regression 
37.56 36.73  36.29 
 
Sargan-Hansen J Statistic 
             (p-value) 
6.57 
(0.25) 
6.80 
(0.24) 
 6.89 
(0.23) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute value of the % change in private consumption since the previous year.  The stand-
ard errors, reported in parenthesis, are corrected for clusters across country observations, and robust to heteroskedasticity.  
GMM-IV is the generalized method of moments estimator.  The instruments for output volatility (the absolute value of the % 
change in output since the previous year) are rest-of-world output volatility, lagged output volatility, twice-lagged values of 
liquid liabilities and bank deposit ratios, and twice-lagged values of volatilities of, both, government consumption-GDP ratios 
and the absolute value of GDP price inflation. The Wald F statistic, from the first-stage regression, is a test of weak identifica-
tion, and the tabulated values in Stock and Yogo (2005) (not shown) indicate the different significant levels. The Sargan-
Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions.  Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-square.  P-values are 
reported in the parenthesis.  The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero respec-
tively at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level of significance.   
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TABLE 3 Continued Consumption Smoothing: 
 GMM-IV (5) GMM-IV (6)  GMM-IV (7)  
   1994-2006  
Output Volatility  0.663
*** 
(0.08) 
0.659*** 
(0.08) 
0.599*** 
(0.10) 
 
OPEN: Trade Openness (log, 
lagged) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.0066** 
(0.0028) 
 
FI: Financial Integration 
(log, lagged) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP (log, 
lagged) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
 
Deposits to Total Bank (incl. 
Central Bank) Assets (log, 
lagged) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.0038 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
 
ADVANCED (0, 1) -0.0025 
(0.003) 
-0.0028 
(0.003) 
-0.0013 
(0.004) 
 
Volatility of Government 
Consumption+ 
0.173*** 
(0.03) 
0.173*** 
(0.03) 
0.153*** 
(0.03) 
 
Volatility of the ratio of CPI 
to GDP deflator (lagged)+ 
0.162** 
(0.064) 
0.162** 
(0.064) 
0.220*** 
(0.06) 
 
CUE: EMU (0-1)  -0.025
*** 
(0.008) 
-0.024*** 
(0.009) 
 
CUX: CU outside EMU  
(0-1) 
0.016 
(0.02) 
0.017 
(0.02) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
 
Maastricht Treaty (0-1)     
Maastricht Treaty: Pre-1999 
(0-1) 
-0.0117** 
(0.0058) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.0059) 
 
Maastricht Treaty: Post-1999 
(0-1) 
-0.0184** 
(0.0071) 
   
Observations 2248 2248 1398  
Number of countries 125 125 125  
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes  
Wald F statistic first-stage 
regression 
36.87 
  
36.36 47.06 
 
 
Sargan-Hansen J Statistic 
(p-value) 
6.94 
(0.23) 
6.82 
(0.24) 
7.96 
(0.16) 
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Appendix A. Data Description  
TABLE A1 Variable Definition 
 Definitions and Sources 
Trade openness The average of export and import to GDP ratios. Source: WDI 
Financial Integration 
Liquid Liabilities/GDP 
The average of total assets and total liabilities to GDP ratios. 
Source: Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2006) and update from the 
authors. 
Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio. Source: Beck et al (2009). 
Deposits to Total (includ-
ing Central Bank) Bank 
Assets 
Ratio of deposit money bank claims on domestic nonfinancial 
real sector to the sum of deposit money bank and Central Bank 
claims on domestic nonfinancial real sector. Source: Beck et al 
(2009) 
Volatility of output The absolute value of % change in GDP at constant US 1990 
prices. Source WDI (2008) 
Volatility of consumption  The absolute value of % change in household consumption 
expenditure. Source: WDI (2008) 
Volatility of government 
consumption  
The absolute value of % change in government consumption to 
GDP. Source: WDI (2008) 
Volatility of the ratio of 
CPI to GDP deflator 
Volatility of the real ex-
change rate 
The absolute value of % change in the ratio of CPI to GDP defla-
tor. Source: WDI (2008) 
 
The absolute value of the % change in the PPP-adjusted real 
exchange rate. Source Penn World Tables 6.2 data 
Currency Union Trade with countries sharing the same currency relative to total trade. Sources: for trade, UN Direction of Trade Stats and WDI 
(2008); for currency unions, Glick and Rose (2002), updated 
with IMF International Financial Statistics. 
CUE or EMU Trade with other EMU members relative to total trade. Source: UN Direction of Trade Statistics and WDI (2008). 
CUX or Currency Union 
outside EMU 
Trade with other countries sharing the same currency relative to 
total trade whenever the currency is not the euro. Source: UN 
Direction of Trade Stats and WDI (2008) 
Maastricht Treaty Trade with other signatories of the Maastricht treaty relative to total trade. Source: UN Direction of Trade Stats and WDI (2008) 
Financial Center Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2006) 
Chinn-Ito Index De jure measure (continuous). Source: Chinn and Ito (2007) 
Area Source: CIA world factbook.  
Literacy Rate Source: CIA world factbook.  
Language diversity Source: Grimes (2000) 
Population Source: WDI (2008) 
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Appendix B. Countries, EMU and EU variables 
 
Part A:  Sample of countries: 
1. Albania*, 2. Algeria, 3. Angola, 4. Argentina, 5. Armenia*, 6. Australia, 7. Austria, 8. Bahrain, 9. Bangladesh, 
10. Belgium, 11. Benin, 12. Bolivia, 13. Botswana*, 14. Brazil, 15. Brunei Darussalam*, 16. Bulgaria*, 17. Burkina 
Faso, 18. Cambodia*, 19. Cameroon*, 20. Canada, 21. Chad, 22. Chile, 23. Colombia, 24. Congo (Dem. Rep.)*, 
25. Congo (Rep.), 26. Costa Rica, 27. Cote d'Ivoire, 28. Croatia*, 29. Czech Republic*, 30. Denmark, 31. Domini-
can Republic, 32. Ecuador, 33. Egypt,  34. El Salvador, 35. Equatorial Guinea*, 36. Estonia*, 37. Ethiopia, 38. Fiji, 
39. Finland, 40 France, 41. Gabon, 42. Georgia*, 43. Germany*, 44. Ghana, 45. Greece, 46. Guatemala, 47. Haiti*, 
48. Honduras, 49. Hungary*, 50. Iceland, 51. India, 52. Indonesia, 53. Iran, 54. Ireland, 55. Israel, 56. Italy, 57. 
Jamaica, 58. Japan, 59. Jordan, 60. Kazakhstan*, 61. Kenya, 62. Korea (Rep.), 63. Kuwait, 64. Kyrgyz Republic*, 
65. Lao PDR, 66. Latvia*, 67. Libya*, 68. Lithuania*, 69. Luxembourg*, 70. Macedonia*, 71. Madagascar, 72. Ma-
lawi, 73. Malaysia, 74. Mali, 75. Mauritius, 76. Mexico, 77. Moldova*, 78. Morocco, 79. Mozambique, 80. Myan-
mar*, 81. Nepal, 82. Netherlands, 83. New Zealand, 84. Niger, 85. Nigeria, 86. Norway, 87. Oman, 88. Pakistan, 
89. Panama, 90. Papua New Guinea, 91. Paraguay, 92. Peru, 93. Philippines, 94. Poland, 95. Portugal, 96. Qatar, 
97. Romania*, 98. Russian Federation*, 99. Rwanda*, 100. Senegal, 101. Singapore, 102. Slovak Republic*, 103. 
Slovenia*, 104. South Africa, 105. Spain, 106. Sri Lanka, 107. Sudan, 108. Swaziland*, 109. Sweden, 110. Switzer-
land, 111. Syria, 112. Tanzania, 113. Thailand, 114. Togo, 115. Trinidad and Tobago*, 116. Tunisia, 117. Turkey, 
118. Uganda, 119. U. K., 120. U. S.*, 121. Uruguay, 122. Venezuela RB, 123. Vietnam, 124. Yemen*, 125. Zam-
bia. 
Notes: Listed are the 125 countries that serve in eq. (3).  The asterisks signal the 34 of them that are not included in 
estimates of both eqs. (4) and eq. (5).  Of these 25, the US is included in (5) not (4) and Germany in (4) not (5).  
Part B: EMU and EU variables 
COUNTRY EMU EU: post-EMU EU: pre-EMU 
Austria* 0.6291 0.7295 0.6490 
Belgium* 0.6072 0.7249 0.7335 
Denmark 0 0.6921 0.5635 
Finland* 0.3381 0.5857 0.5304 
France 0.5600 0.6847 0.5233 
Germany 0.4222 0.5676 0.4543 
Greece* 0.4567 0.5540 0.5782 
Ireland 0.3294 0.6170 0.5880 
Italy 0.4703 0.5701 0.5295 
Luxembourg* 0.8830 0.9811 0.8408 
Netherlands 0.5834 0.7322 0.5025 
Portugal 0.7015 0.8013 0.7140 
Spain 0.5546 0.6569 0.6494 
Sweden* 0 0.6079 0.5552 
United Kingdom 0 0.5292 0.4456 
Notes: Part B only shows values for countries that were members of the EU prior to the entries of 2004. Therefore, 
there are no values for Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, even though 
these countries figure in EU post-EMU for all EU members over the years 2004-2006.  As a rule, EMU values cover 
1999-2006; EU: post-EMU values (which correspond exactly to Maastricht Treaty Post-1999) cover 1999-2006; and 
EU: pre-EMU values (which correspond exactly to Maastricht Treaty Pre-1999) cover 1993-1998.  However, the 
asterisks mark exceptions. For Greece, EMU covers 2001-2006. For Belgium and Luxembourg, no separate trade 
figures exist prior to 1997, therefore EU: pre-EMU strictly concerns 1997-1998 (and both countries fall out of the 
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estimates for earlier years). Austria, Finland and Sweden only entered the EU in 1995. 
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Appendix C. Consumption smoothing for uniform country/years 
Table C1 
 GMM-IV (1) GMM-IV (2) Pooled OLS (3) GMM-IV (4) 
Output Volatility  0.582
*** 
(0.10) 
0.569*** 
(0.10) 
0.567*** 
(0.11) 
0.578*** 
(0.10) 
OPEN: Trade Openness (log, 
lagged) 
0.011** 
(0.0046) 
0.010** 
(0.0045) 
 0.0148* 
(0.008) 
0.011** 
(0.0044) 
FI: Financial Integration 
(log, lagged) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP (log, 
lagged) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Deposits to Total Bank  
Assets (log, lagged) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
ADVANCED (0, 1) -0.0045 
(0.0033) 
-0.003 
(0.0034) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
Volatility of Government 
Consumption 
0.200*** 
(0.04) 
0.198*** 
(0.04) 
0.263*** 
(0.095) 
0.198*** 
(0.04) 
Volatility of the ratio of CPI 
to GDP deflator (lagged) 
0.154** 
(0.067) 
0.155** 
(0.067) 
0.183 
(0.157) 
0.155** 
(0.067) 
CUE: EMU (0-1)  -0.0174
** 
(0.008) 
-0.022** 
(0.01) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
CUX: CU outside EMU (0-1)  0.009 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0.034) 
0.009 
(0.03) 
Maastricht Treaty (0-1)     -0.009
** 
(0.0044) 
Observations 1598 1598 1706 1598 
Number of countries 90 90 91 90 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared   0.27  
Wald F statistic first-stage 
regression     
16.21 
  
16.20 
 
 16.22 
 
Sargan-Hansen J Statistic 
(p-value) 
5.45 
(0.49) 
5.57 
(0.47) 
 5.52 
(0.48) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute value of the % change in private consumption since the previous year.  
The standard errors, reported in parenthesis, are corrected for clusters across country observations, and robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  GMM-IV is the generalized method of moments estimator.  The instruments for output volatili-
ty (the absolute value of the % change in output since the previous year) are rest-of-world output volatility, lagged 
and twice-lagged output volatility, twice-lagged values of liquid liabilities and bank deposit ratios, and twice-lagged 
values of volatilities of, both, government consumption-GDP ratios and the absolute value of GDP price inflation.  
The Wald F statistic, from the first-stage regression, is a test of weak identification, and the tabulated values in 
Stock and Yogo (2005) (not shown) indicate the different significant levels. The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of 
over-identifying restrictions.  Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-square.  P-values are reported in 
the parenthesis. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero respec-
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tively at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level of significance.   
 
Table C1 (continued) 
 GMM-IV (5)  GMM-IV (6) GMM-IV (7) 
   1994-2006 
Output Volatility+  0.581
*** 
(0.10) 
0.574*** 
(0.10) 
0.470*** 
(0.153) 
OPEN: Trade Openness (log, 
lagged) 
0.011** 
(0.0045) 
0.011** 
(0.0045) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
FI: Financial Integration 
(log, lagged) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP (log, 
lagged) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Deposits to Total Bank (incl. 
Central Bank) Assets (log, 
lagged) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
ADVANCED (0, 1) -0.0012 
(0.0035) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.0019 
(0.005) 
Volatility of Government 
Consumption 
0.198*** 
(0.03) 
0.198*** 
(0.04) 
0.183*** 
(0.04) 
Volatility of the ratio of CPI 
to GDP deflator (lagged) 
0.156** 
(0.067) 
0.155** 
(0.084) 
0.151** 
(0.076) 
CUE: EMU (0-1)  -0.019
** 
(0.0083) 
-0.022** 
(0.0095) 
CUX: CU outside EMU  
(0-1) 
0.009 
(0.03) 
0.0095 
(0.03) 
0.0042 
(0.04) 
Maastricht Treaty (0-1)     
Maastricht Treaty: Pre-1999 
(0-1) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.0092* 
(0.0049) 
-0.0181*** 
(0.0062) 
Maastricht Treaty: Post-1999 
(0-1) 
-0.0142** 
(0.006) 
 
 
 
 
Observations 1598 1598 946 
Number of countries 90 90 90 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Wald F statistic first-stage 
regression 
16.25 
  
16.20 
 
16.95 
 
Sargan-Hansen J Statistic 
(p-value) 
5.51 
(0.48)                         
5.53 
(0.48) 
6.19 
(0.40) 
 
